incident response

An interesting paper from ENISA and the NATO Cyberdefence Centre illustrates the narrow space that the law allows for incident response, and the importance of ensuring that new laws don’t prevent incident response teams from protecting networks, systems, their users and information against attack.

Malicious software, generally shortened to malware, is involved in a wide variety of security incidents, from botnets and phishing to industrial sabotage. Analysing what malware does and how it can be detected, neutralised and removed from infected computers is an important part of keeping networks and computers secure.

I participated in an interesting discussion last week at ENISA’s Expert Group on Barriers to Cooperation between CERTs and Law Enforcement. Such cooperation seems most likely to occur with national/governmental CERTs but I’ve been keen to avoid recommendations that they be given special treatment, not least because of the risk that such treatment might actually create barriers between them and other CERTs.

The Ministry of Justice have published a summary of the responses to their consultation on European Data Protection proposals. On the issues we raised around Internet Identifiers, Breach Notification and Cloud Computing there seems to be general agreement with our concerns.