incident response

Bug bounty schemes have always been controversial. In the early days of the Internet someone who found a bug in software was expected to inform the author and help fix it, as a matter of social responsibility. Suggesting that those researching vulnerabilities be paid for their time and effort seemed rather grubby. Unfortunately not everyone shared those scruples.

Two talks on the first day of the FIRST conference highlighted the increasing range of equipment and data that can be found on the Internet, and the challenges that this presents both for risk assessment and, if incidents do happen, assessing the severity of the possible breach and what measures need to be taken.

It’s interesting to read the Information Commissioner’s comments on the draft European Data Protection Regulation, which have just been published. A number of the comments address issues we’ve been struggling with in providing Internet services such as incident response and federated access management.

At last week’s TF-CSIRT meeting, Gavin Reid from Cisco suggested that we may have been over-optimistic about how much technology can do to detect and prevent incidents. Automated incident prevention systems can be effective at detecting and preventing automated attacks but are less effective against targeted attacks that use human intelligence rather than brute force. In the worst case an organisation that relies too much on automation may end up designing its security stance to suit the available automation systems, rather than the other way around.