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Can ISPs help with Botnets?

Wednesday, June 6, 2012 - 10:29

An interesting talk at the GovCERT.nl Symposium by Michel van Eeten of Delft University. For some time, and in many countries, there have been suggestions that ISPs should be encouraged, perhaps by legislation, to do more to protect other internet users from their customers. Discussion has tended to focus on the possibility of using network flow data to determine which customers' PCs are members of botnets and then to place those customers into some sort of quarantine, with more restricted network access, until they have cleaned their machines (see, for example, the anti-botnet agreement between Dutch ISPs in 2009).

However given the very large number of ISPs in the world (in discussion of the Digital Economy Act it was suggested that there may be over 400 in the UK alone) it has never been clear whether this approach was likely to be effective. How many ISPs would need to act to significantly reduce the problem? Prof.van Eeten has analysed data from spam traps, Conficker sinkholes and the Dshield distributed monitoring system, covering more than 400 million infected IP addresses, and concludes that these are indeed concentrated in a relatively small number of ISPs - the "top" 50 ISPs contain more than half of these addresses. These are spread widely across those countries with good Internet connectivity, so actions by single countries seem unlikely to significantly improve the global situation. However there is wide variation in infection rates (percentage of customers infected) between ISPs in the same country - up to two orders of magnitude, in some cases - so it appears that significant improvements could be obtained just by wider implementation of existing good practice.

Any quarantine system has a significant economic difficulty because customers placed in quarantine are likely to need individual help in cleaning their systems. If ISPs have to bear the cost of this support then there will be a strong economic pressure not to inform customers that they have a problem. South Korea has apparently addressed this problem by creating a government-funded support centre that ISPs can direct infected customers to.

The research paper has been published by the OECD's Information Security and Privacy working party so it will be interesting to see how it influences legal, technical and practical developments.

[UPDATE: the report has been picked up by the BBC]

[UPDATE: a further study looking in more detail at ISPs in the Netherlands has also been published]